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 
Abstract—This economic experiment initiates in evaluating a 
model's performance in predicting a decision. The reciprocity model 
is measured its accuracy rate in prediction and informativeness as 
aspects of the model's performance. Seventy-nine undergraduate 
students voluntarily joined the experiment. They made decisions 
contingently in designed situations as the first player in a dictator 
game and all roles in trust-share games. The study controls effects of 
choice set (equal split, competitive, and different social welfare 
choices) and framing effect. The result shows that the model has high 
performance in both prediction and informative. Furthermore, it 
shows an existence of the loss aversion behavior, and a significant 
relationship between decisions in the dictator game and the trust-
share games. The study suggests that the more complicated model 
may not be marginally useful in predicting decision in the positive 
reciprocity situations. 
 
Keywords—Economic experiment, performance, reciprocity, 
trust-share game. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ANY countries show their support in the tragedy of 2011-
tsunami in Japan. Thailand is one of the most 
encouraging countries to support by founding many donation 
campaigns from both government and private sectors. This 
supporting phenomenon is very interesting because, not only is 
it a common act of humanity, but it shows that many Thais 
believe they should express their kindness to the Japanese due 
to the 2004-tsunami in Thailand. Japanese was among the 
leading countries who gave Thailand a high number of 
donation. 
 This story is a good example how people decide in 
exchanging favors. They are willing to return favors if they 
were given. In economic studies, the exchanging-favors 
situation is called positive reciprocity situation which recent 
studies in economic psychology have focused on [1]-[9]. They 
aimed to point out the important factors which affect how 
people make a decision, and models, both simple and 
complicated, were proposed [4]-[8]. 
 This study aims to initiate the next step in evaluating a 
model's performance in predicting a decision. According to 
Samuelson [10], a good model must be simple, accurate, and 
informative. Therefore, among various models, this study 
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selects the reciprocity model proposed by Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger [8] because of its simplicity. To evaluate the 
model's performance, both accuracy rate in prediction and 
informativeness are measured at individual level in this study.  
 The study designs four trust-share games as positive 
reciprocity situations to test the model's performance. 
Moreover, it designs a choice set in the games to make the 
reciprocity as the only motivation to the reciprocal decision. 
Hence, this study can explore the model's performance with 
limiting factors like other scientific experiments. 
 In addition, the author would like to state the asymmetric 
decision according to the loss aversion theory. It says people 
use different logic in making decisions between to gain and to 
lose. Therefore, one out of the four trust-share games collects a 
decision-to-lose data by designing it as a negative payoff 
structure. 
 Furthermore, this study collects a decision in a dictator 
game (DG). It aims to state a relationship between the decision 
in DG and the trust-share games since the author believes that 
DG is related to the positive reciprocity situations. To be 
precise, the more the dictator gives, the more he shows his 
kindness. Therefore, the dictator has higher tendencies to 
reciprocally return favors in the positive reciprocity situations. 
  
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1) To evaluate the performance of the reciprocity model 
proposed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [8] in positive 
reciprocity situations. 
2) To examine an existence of the loss aversion behavior in 
the positive reciprocity situations. 
3) To examine a relationship between the decision in DG and 
the decision in the trust-share games.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
 This part has four sections. The first two sections present 
the trust-share games and the DG, consecutively. Then, the 
reciprocity model is presented in order to make a conclusion 
how the decision in the trust-share games is predicted. Last, 
the experiment protocol and measurement methods are briefly 
explained. 
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A. The Trust-share Games  
 
Fig. 1 Extensive form of the trust-share game in this study 
 
TABLE I 
PAYOFF STRUCTURES OF THE TRUST-SHARE GAMES IN THIS STUDY 
Name Type a b 
Low PTS 
Positive payoff 
50 50 
Medium PTS 100 100 
High PTS 200 200 
NTS Negative payoff -200 -600 
 
Fig. 1 and Table 1 present the four trust-share games used as 
positive reciprocity situations in this study. The game is two-
player-sequential situation with perfect information. The 1
st
 
player (P1) has to decide either to dissolve the situation or to 
trust the 2
nd
 player (P2). If P1 dissolves, the situation is ended 
and both are paid as specified. But if P1 trusts P2, then P2 
makes a decision whether to act selfishly by keeping additional 
300 points or to act reciprocally by sharing 100 points to P1 
and keeping the rest. The situations make P2 has a conflict of 
interests since P1's trust means he gave favors to P2 then P2 is 
supposed to reciprocally return, but his selfish act also gives 
him more payoff by not giving P1. 
Three positive payoff trust-share games (PTS) and one 
negative (NTS) are designed. Only positive reciprocity is 
scoped, because, according to the Fig. 1, P1's trust gives P2 
higher payoff than his dissolving, then P1's trust clearly gives 
P2 a signal of giving favors. Moreover, in order to make this 
study is able to explore a direct effect of the reciprocal signal, 
the design avoids the following; 
i) Equal split choice which equally yields P1 and P2's 
payoffs.  
ii) Competitive choice which P1 gets higher payoff than P2 
in one choice while the other choice makes P2 gets higher 
payoff than P1.  
iii) Different social welfare choice which each choice yields 
different amount of summed P1 and P2's payoffs.  
According to recent studies [4]-[7], the choices have a 
significant effect on the subject's decision. 
B. Dictator Game 
 DG is a two-person situation that only P1, called as a 
dictator, makes a decision but both P1 and P2 get paid. The 
dictator decides how many points he will keep from 200 
points, and the rest will be given to P2. For example, if he 
keeps 150 points, then P2 gets 50 points. 
 The amount of points taken by the dictator is believed to 
imply his reciprocity in the trust-share games. For instance, a 
dictator who keeps 150 points is believed to act reciprocally in 
the trust-share games with a probability less than the one who 
keeps 100 points. 
C. The Reciprocity Model 
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Equation (1) is the reciprocity model proposed by 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [8]. It is the P2's utility function, 
 2u , which 1a = P1's decision, 2a = P2's decision, 
1
2b = P2's 
expectation on P1's decision, 
12
2b = P2's expectation on P1's 
expectation on P2's decision, 
1
2e = P1's equitable payoff under 
P2's idea, 
2
2e = P2's equitable payoff under his idea, 2 = 
reciprocal parameter of P2, 2m = P2's material payoff, 2G = 
P2's favors given to P1, 2T = P2's favors taken from P1. 
According to the model, P2 decides his decision 2a  in 
order to maximize his utility level given the rest variables. 
Thus, the model can predict P2's decision if the rest variables 
are known. By using the sequential reciprocity equilibrium 
proposed by [8], some variables can be known as followed; 
i) P2 is the last mover, thus 1a  is known.  
ii) 1a =
1
2b  and 2a =
12
2b   
iii) 
1
2e  and 
2
2e  are calculated by the model's definition. 
 Therefore, the reciprocal parameter 2  is the only 
unknown. Then, P2's decision will be related to the level of the 
parameter. According to the model, the parameter is a relative 
weight between P2's material payoff and the value from favors 
exchanging. If the parameter is zero then the model is the same 
as the traditional model. Hence, P2 is expected to act selfishly 
if the parameter is low, and vice versa. 
In this study, the relationship between the P2's decision and 
reciprocal parameter is fixed in all trust-share games by the 
design payoff structures which calculation detail is provided in 
the Appendix. Then, the model can predict that each subject 
must decide the same in every trust-share game. For example, 
a subject who decided to act selfishly in Low PTS is predicted 
to act selfishly in other games, and vice versa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
D. Experiment Protocol and Analysis Methods 
 
TABLE II 
CROSS TABLE BY USING ONE TRUST-SHARE GAME AS A CONDITION, AND 
ANOTHER AS AN OUTCOME. A,B,C,D IS NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH GROUP. 
  
Outcome 
  
0=Share 1=Selfish 
Condition 
0=Share 
True 
Share=A 
False 
Selfish=B 
1=Selfish 
False 
Share=C 
True 
Selfish=D 
 
.
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Seventy-nine undergraduate students (64 are economic 
students, and 15 are not or not specified) at the Chulalongkorn 
University in Thailand voluntarily joined this hand-run 
economic experiment. Each subject decided how many points 
he would keep from 200 points in DG, and contingently 
decided as both roles in each trust-share game. The dictator 
game came first, and followed by the trust-share games which 
were shuffled. It was a double-blind experiment which staff 
had been trained how to conduct the experiment. The 
experiment uses words, in both subject's document and 
instructor's script, to prevent systematic framing effects, such 
as "situation" instead of "game", "mover" instead of "player", 
"decision A" instead of "trust", etc. Subjects were informed for 
the random matching process, and paid according to P1-P2 
decision. Also, they were informed to independently decide in 
each situation, and did not allow to change their decisions in 
previous situations. The experiment was designed to pay 75 - 
225 bahts/hour (with real paid at 125 bahts/hour) for a subject, 
which is higher than his normal income. The experiment took 
about 2 hours. 
Subject's decisions in P2 role in the trust-share games are 
analyzed. The accuracy rate is measured at individual level as 
presented in Table II and (2). According to the table and 
equation, switching the situations from a condition to an 
outcome will give the same accuracy rate. Then, the four trust-
share games can be paired up to six pairs of a condition and an 
outcome. 
One trust-share game is selected as a condition, which a 
decision of each subject in the game implies to his decision in 
other trust-share games. Another trust-share game is selected 
as an outcome. A pair of subject's condition-outcome decisions 
can be categorized as presented in Table II. The accuracy rate 
as presented in (2) is a measurement of the percentage of 
correct prediction by the model which represents the model's 
performance in accuracy and precision. 
Moreover, aggregate level decision is measured for the 
probability of selfish decision as a baseline probability without 
using the model. The baseline probability can be compared 
with the accuracy rate, which informs the conditional 
probability of subject's decision by using the model, to 
measure for the model's performance in informativeness. To be 
precise, if the accuracy rate is higher than the baseline 
probability then the model is informative, and vice versa. 
The baseline probability between PTSs and NTS is 
compared to state an existence of the loss aversion behavior. If 
the baseline probability in PTSs is significantly different from 
the NTS's, then there is an evidence of the loss aversion 
behavior. Furthermore, the interaction effect between loss 
aversion and reciprocity can be stated that which one has 
stronger effect. For instance, if the baseline probability of 
selfish decision in NTS is higher than PTSs' then the loss 
aversion has stronger effect than the other, and vice versa. 
Lastly, the relationship between the decision in DG and the 
trust-share games is measured by Spearman's rank correlation. 
E. Assumptions and Limitations 
1) This study assumed that each subject has a constant 
reciprocal parameter across situations. 
2) Independent decision across situations is another 
important assumption. 
3) This study only focuses on pure strategy. It is possible that 
the observed decision is randomly drawn from a 
distribution function over choices. 
4) Framing-effect-free experiment can be concerned as one 
limitation, the result may not be consistent if the effect 
exists. 
5) Repetition, one subject decides in many situations, is 
unavoidable. It is a potential cause of a systematic error. 
6) Role switching is also another limitation in this study. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
TABLE III 
PERCENTAGE OF P2'S SELFISH DECISION AND STANDARD ERROR IN THE TRUST-
SHARE GAMES. 
 
Percentage of P2's selfish decision SE 
LowPTS 71% 5.1% 
MedPTS 73% 5.0% 
HighPTS 71% 5.1% 
NTS 94% 2.8% 
 
TABLE IV 
ACCURACY RATE OF A PAIR OF THE CONDITION AND OUTCOME 
 
Medium PTS High PTS NTS 
Low PTS 85% 85% 75% 
Medium PTS - 82% 75% 
High PTS - - 75% 
 
TABLE V 
SPEARMAN'S RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DECISION IN DG AND OTHERS 
 Low PTS Medium PTS High PTS NTS 
Spearman's 0.40 0.43 0.32 0.12 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.30 
 
 
  
1) As presented in Table III, the average probability of 
selfish decision in PTSs is 71% - 73% (with 72% on 
average), and 94% in NTS. The results show us the 
baseline probability of observing the selfish decision in 
the subject group. 
2) From Table IV, average accuracy rate is 82% - 85% with 
average at 84% among PTSs. This is the conditional 
probability when using one PTS as a condition and 
another PTS as an outcome. It implies the high 
performance of the model when it predicts a decision 
across PTSs. 
3) The average accuracy rate between PTSs and NTS is 
75%. This is the conditional probability when using one 
PTS as a condition and NTS as an outcome, or switching 
them. It implies that the model has lower performance 
when it predicts a decision between PTS and NTS, 
compared to the performance in prediction across PTSs 
4) Using one PTS as a condition, the model can increase 
12% of correct prediction of a decision in other PTSs 
from 72% at the baseline probability to 84% at the 
conditional probability. Also, using NTS as a condition, 
the model can increase 3% of doing so. But using PTS as 
a condition, the model cannot increase the percent of 
correct prediction from the baseline probability at 94%. It 
implies that the model is informative either using PTS or 
NTS, but it is the best to use PTS, as a condition to 
predict a decision in other PTSs. In addition, a model may 
not be needed to predict a decision in NTS because its 
baseline probability of selfish decision is very high at 
94%. Hence, it may not efficient to use a model and a 
designed situation as a condition to increase marginal rate 
of correct prediction. 
5) The baseline probability of selfish decision in NTS is 22% 
higher than in PTSs. It implies for an existence of the loss 
aversion behavior. Moreover, the increasing in the rate of 
selfish decision in NTS is also an evidence that the effect 
of the loss aversion is stronger than the reciprocity. 
6) From Table V, the Spearman's rank correlation shows a 
significantly positive relationship, which means the more 
the dictator takes the lower tendency he will share, at 0.05 
level of significance between the decision in DG and the 
decision in PTSs, but does not with the decision in NTS. 
It shows that the decision in DG can imply the degree of 
positive reciprocity. According to the model, the degree of 
positive reciprocity is presented by the reciprocal 
parameter. Hence, DG may be used as a condition to 
predict a decision in other positive reciprocity situations 
with positive payoff structure. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
While previous studies aimed to explore important factors in 
order to understand reality and propose the mathematical 
models, this study initiates the next step to verify a model's 
validity in applicability. The study evaluates a model's 
performance in the aspects according to what Samuelson [10] 
suggested. Beside the initiation, this study also develops a new 
technique in designing a controlled experiment to be able to 
use a cross table as presented in Table II to do the analysis at 
individual level. 
Seventy-nine undergraduate students joined this hand-run 
economic experiment to make decisions in the model 
situations. This study designs 3 PTSs and one NTS as the 
positive reciprocity situations to verify the performance of the 
reciprocity model proposed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
[8]. Among various models, the Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger's model has its strength in simplicity, which is one 
aspect in a good model, by just only one parameter, the 
reciprocal parameter, is used to capture individual relative 
preference between selfish and reciprocal decisions. 
The result among PTSs shows that the model has high 
performance in accurately predicting a decision, and high 
performance in informativeness from marginal gain in the rate 
of correct prediction. It suggests that the more complicated 
model may not necessary to be used in order to increase the 
marginal gain in the rate of correct prediction but increase in 
marginal cost of using the model. Moreover, for the NTS, the 
result shows that, together with the existence of stronger effect 
of the loss aversion than the effect of the reciprocity, we can 
expect people to make a selfish decision at the very high rate 
without using any additional information. Hence, the result 
still convinces that the more complicated model may be not 
informative enough according to the cost of using it. 
Furthermore, the study finds a significantly positive 
relationship between the decisions in DG and PTSs. The 
finding shows a possibility that the decision in DG may be 
used to estimate the reciprocal parameter in the model because 
the decision in DG provides quantitative data whereas other 
games like the trust-share game provide qualitative data. 
However, the decision in DG can also be used as a condition 
in developing a new reciprocity model. 
For one who is interested in extending from this study, it is 
interesting to evaluate the model's performance in more 
complicated situations such as 3-choice or 3-player ones. 
Adding the effect of equal split, competition, or different 
social welfare choice, or framing effect is also a possible 
extension. 
APPENDIX 
The relationship between P2's decision and the reciprocal 
parameter: from (1), let 1, 121 ba  for dissolve and 
1, 1222 ba  for selfish. The following equations come from 
the model's definition, 
   .1001001 12212122 eaababG   (3) 
   .2001001 2212212122 ebbbbbT   (4) 
    .,,5.0 min2121max212112 abmabme   (5) 
    .,,5.0 122min,122122max,12212 bbmbbme   (6) 
  
Which ba,  are payoff structure as in Fig. 1, max
2a  is P2's 
decision to maximize P1's payoff given 
1
2b , 
min
2a  is P2's 
decision to minimize P1's payoff given 
1
2b , 
max,1
2b  is P2's 
expectation on P1's decision that maximizes P2's payoff given 
12
2b , and 
min,1
2b  is P2's expectation on P1's decision that 
minimizes P2's payoff given 
12
2b . From the designed structure, 
1min,12 b  and 0
max,1
2 b . For P2, if he has a chance to make a 
decision then he knows that 0121  ba . Thus, 0
max
2 a  and 
1min2 a . Then, P2's utility function can be re-written at his 
decision node from (1) and (3)-(6) as, 
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Which from (7), by consistent belief condition in sequential 
equilibrium, 
*
2
12
2 ab   if 
*
2a  is a P2's decision in sequential 
equilibrium, the relationship between P2's decision and 
reciprocal parameter can be expressed by P2's best response 
function in pure strategy, 2BR , 
   .
100
10
150
11 2
*
22
*
22   aoraBR  (8) 
Hence, the best response shows the fixed relationship between 
P2's decision and his reciprocal parameter for all trust-share 
games as specified in Fig. 1. 
Q.E.D. 
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